

01 Attack

Aln't safe here



AML: Adversarial Machine Learning

Exploit the vulnerabilities in ML models by making small, often imperceptible changes to the input data

-> leads to significant **errors** in the model's **output**

Evasion attacks

During the **deployment** phase

Minor alterations to the input data that are imperceptible to humans but lead the model to produce incorrect outputs



Poisoning attacks

During the **training** phase

Introduce malicious data into the training set, corrupting the learning process & embedding errors into the model



Model Extraction attacks

Reverse-engineer ML model's internal parameters or architecture

Replicate model's behaviour or extract sensitive info


COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE



Model inversion attacks

Reconstruct sensitive input data from the models' outputs

Result: severe privacy breaches



Prompt injection attacks

Manipulate **input prompts** to Al models to alter their behaviour or outputs

Result: harmful content, misinformation, or malicious actions if users trust the Al response



Real-World Implications

Healthcare



Finance



Transportation



Cybersecurity



Cybersecurity

Keeping computers secure



NEXT-GENERATION ANTIVIRUS (NGAV)

EXPLORE NGAV SOLUTION

Anne Aarness - January 07, 2025

Shut the door on cyber threats

Darktrace is different from legacy cyber. Our self-learning Al learns from your data to defend against attacks across domains.

Al-powered cyber defenses

Robust, battle-proven products and services that combine AI technologies and human expertise, delivered through Sophos' adaptive Al-native platform.

Speak to an expert

Download solution brief &




Autonomous Vehicles

From A to B, automatically



Smart Assistants

Optimizing Productivity



Apple Intelligence

Al for the rest of us. Available now*

Get Al assistance in Workspace apps

Google Workspace with + Gemini Do your best work faster with Al built into our popular apps like Gmail, Docs, Sheets, Meet, Chat, Vids, and more.

Chat with Google's next-aen Al

Explore plans to see what's included

Gemini Advanced

NotebookLM Plus Build a team of Al experts to tackle your most complex projects-including coding, deep podcast-like Audio Overviews to help accelerate team knowledge sharing with NotebookLM Plus research, and data analysis-with Gemini Learn more [2]

Surface insights

faster with Al

GPTs

Discover and create custom versions of ChatGPT that combine instructions, extra knowledge, and any combination of skills.

Applications that can reason. Powered by LangChain.

Al-native email for business

Supercharge your productivity with advanced AI & real-time team collaboration

Meet Claude

Claude is AI for all of us. Whether you're brainstorming alone or building with a team of thousands, Claude is here to help.

How customers are making more informed shopping decisions with Rufus, Amazon's generative Al-powered shopping assistant

Rufus is now available to all U.S. customers in the Amazon Shopping app and on desktop.

Retail Rufus Artificial brooklyware Shopping Customers

Slack AI has arrived

Get up to speed on your workday instantly with our new generative AI features, available now

By the team at Slack

Cylance, I Kill You!



Update: 07/Sep/2019

We had the honour to present our findings in today's BSides Sydney (Slides).

We took this opportunity to make some of the yet unpublished materials public

We can now reveal that the undisclosed game we've used is "Rocket League", but many others work just as well (we've tried Fortnite, for example).

Some more goodies include the special sauce - the list of strings that appears in Rocket League's executable and are part of Cylance's Model. Just append these into any malicious executable to make Cylance believe it's benign.

As of today, the bypass is still exploitable on the home edition (Cylance SmartAV). The vendor has told us the enterprise edition (CylancePROTECT) has been fixed, but we were unable to verify that. If you have access to the enterprise edition and can confirm the fix, please let us know in the comments box at the bottom of the page.

TL;DR


Al applications in security are clear and potentially useful, however Al based products offer a new and unique attack surface. Namely, if you could truly understand how a certain model works, and the type of features it uses to reach a decision, you would have the potential to fool it consistently, creating a universal bypass. By carefully analyzing the engine and model of Cylance's Al based antivirus product, we identify a peculiar bias towards a specific game. Combining an analysis of the feature extraction process, its heavy reliance on strings, and its strong bias for this specific game, we are capable of crafting a simple and rather amusing bypass. Namely, by appending a selected list of strings to a malicious file, we are capable of changing its score significantly, avoiding detection. This method proved successful for 100% of the top 10 Malware for May 2019, and close to 90% for a larger sample of 384 malware.

Read the full post to understand the research process itself, the inner workings of an advanced Al based EPP and how we found the universal bypass.




Cylance, I Kill You!

Attacking Malware Classifiers




Adversarial Traffic Signs

Fooling all the cars



Phishing Attacks

Google Gemini for Workspace




02 Defense, Who watches the watchers?

ATLAS Matrix

Hallucinated Entities

The ATLAS Matrix below shows the progression of tactics used in attacks as columns from left to right, with ML techniques belonging to each tactic below. & indicates an adaption from ATLAS (Lick on the blue links to learn more about each item, or search and view ATLAS tactics and techniques using the links at the top navigation bar. View the ATLAS matrix highlighted alongside ATT&CK Enterprise techniques on the ATLAS Navigator.




MITRE ATLAS

Categorizing Al Threats

AI Governance & Compliance

- Bias detection, explainability, fairness, risk assessments

- Ethical, legal, and regulatory standards



Al Security & Adversarial Defense

- Protecting Models from attacks
- Al Red teaming, adversarial defenses, securing pipelines



Al Privacy & Data Protection

- Data security, differential privacy, regulatory compliance
- Prevents sensitive info leakage



Al Monitoring & Performance Management

- Preventing model drift, bias shifts, performance degradation



So what?





Explainability

Ensures AI decisions are understandable and transparent to build trust



Al AppSec

Protects Al systems from adversarial attacks, data breaches, and vulnerabilities.



Manages the entire lifecycle of Al models, ensuring performance and continuous improvement.



Privacy

Safeguards user data and ensures compliance with privacy regulations like GDPR.



HiddenLayer

Al Security and Protection from Adversarial Attacks

They use a specialized **MITRE ATT&CK for AI** framework to combat adversarial threats.

Challenges:

- Evolving Attack Strategies
- Data Poisoning
- Scalability





Enveil



Data Privacy and Secure AI with Homomorphic Encryption

They've developed a cutting-edge technology called "Homomorphic Encryption", which allows data to be processed without ever being decrypted.

Challenges

- Performance Overhead
- Adoption Barriers
- Regulatory Compliance



Booz Allen

e, and

Al Defense in Various Domains, Including Defense, Healthcare, and Finance


They are leading the way in developing "adversarial image perturbation robustness" in AI models, enhancing the resilience of computer vision systems to subtle, manipulative changes in images.

Challenges:

- Balancing Robustness and Accuracy
- Resource Constraints
- Interdisciplinary Collaboration



Booz Allen





New Entrants

Navigating AI TRISM and building trust is complex

Supplier Power

Gains influence due to compliance requirements

Existing Rivalries

Fierce competition to develop compliant Al TRISM solutions

Substitutes

Few viable alternatives due to compliance

Buyer Power

Low buying power due to compliance requirements



Implications





Social

Bias & Fairness Public Trust Privacy Compliance Data Protection Liability


Legal





Ethical

Explainability Misinformation Accountability



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